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Climate governance in an international system under 
conservative hegemony: the role of major powers
A governança climática em um sistema internacional sob  





In the last five years, a series of broad movements – in both physical and 
social terms – has led to the consolidation of climate change as a key civilizational 
driver1 of our time. On the one hand, the scientific community has gathered 
enough evidence to state that the phenomenon of an anthropic destabilization of 
the climate system is a near-consensus idea (IPCC 2007). On the other hand, the 
increasing number of extreme weather events has contributed to consolidate the 
perception that we are no longer faced with a theoretical speculation distant in 
time, but that there is an urgent and tangible reality in front of our eyes (WMO 
2011). Such consequences have repeatedly been the subject of various researches 
in the most diverse fields of human knowledge. 
As a consequence, many social processes – and the fields of science which study 
them – have had their dynamics altered: Economy, Politics2, Security and Defense, 
etc. In International Relations (IR), this double challenge could be explained as 
follows: in empirical terms, climate change imposes a deepening of cooperation 
levels on the international community, considering the global common character 
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1  Civilizational macro-drivers can be defined as the deepest trends of the relation between mankind and the 
biosphere; population dynamics, human settlements around the planet, increase in work productivity, growing 
consumption of Earth resources and technological development are examples of these long-term trends. Bearing 
this in mind, the imbalance of the climate system is a position equivalent to other fundamental processes of our 
current civilizational process: globalization and democracy.
2  According to the notion of climate change being a key civilizational driver, in another work (Viola, Franchini 
and Ribeiro 2012) we argue that the concept of climate commitment should be used as part of the criteria to 
evaluate the quality of a democratic regime.
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of the atmosphere; as to IR as a discipline, climate change demands from the 
scientific community a conceptual review of the categories designed to approach 
the development of global climate governance, in a context of systemic change. 
The framework related to this double challenge is the migration of the 
climate issue to the core of international politics, which means that the patterns 
of cooperation and conflict that define this very sphere of social interaction will 
be more and more influenced by the characteristics of the responses to the climate 
challenge. 
The continuing key role of the climate crisis for human future is related to 
the concept of planetary boundaries. In the natural sciences community, it is more 
and more consensual that increasingly anthropic pressure on the Earth system 
could lead to an abrupt change of global environment (Rockstrom et al. 2009). 
Being the leading drivers of global systemic change, human actions threaten to 
destabilize critical biophysical systems, having detrimental or even catastrophic 
consequences to mankind’s well-being. For the last 10,000 years, Earth has been 
operating within the stable domain of the Holocene, where certain biogeochemical 
and atmospheric parameters have stayed within a relatively narrow range. However, 
since the industrial revolution, our actions have been effectively pushing a series of 
key processes of the Earth system out of the stable variation range. This shift signals 
the transition from the Holocene to the Anthropocene, which comprehends two 
processes: the anthropic factor as the leading driver of systemic climate change, 
and the deviation – which has profound potential consequences – from the stable 
patterns of the Holocene. 
Within this framework, the scientific community has advanced in the 
identification of nine planetary boundaries within which humankind could safely 
operate. Transgressing these boundaries implies entering a risk zone of systemic 
environmental disruption. The notion of planetary boundaries rises as a new way to 
deal with sustainability, not in an isolated and localized form factor (sector analysis 
of growth limits and mitigation of negative externalities) as in the traditional 
environmental approach, but in a systemic, global fashion. 
The nine planetary boundaries are: climate change, ocean acidification, 
stratospheric ozone depletion, nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, freshwater use, 
change in land use, rate of biodiversity loss, chemical pollution, and atmospheric 
aerosol loading. The first seven can be quantified, and three out of the nine 
planetary boundaries have already been crossed: climate change, rate of biodiversity 
loss and the nitrogen cycle. 
The goal of this chapter is to discuss in both conceptual and empirical terms 
the structure of global climate governance, through an exploratory research, aiming 
at identifying the key elements that allow understanding its dynamics. In this 
structure, a specific kind of agent is prominent in shaping climate social outcome 
– the climate powers. These great state actors are considered leading agents in this 
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Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – loses its relevance in 
driving the global transition towards a low-carbon economy.
The notion of major power that is used here entails the capacity of societies, 
or in more specific terms, the convergence of the state, the market and civil society. 
It is not restricted to the idea of state power of the realist doctrine, described as 
a rational actor where internal social and economic dynamics are not relevant. 
This discussion is theoretically framed accordingly to an international 
system under a conservative hegemony, which is open to change and uncertain. 
Conservative here reflects the inaptitude of current structures of global governance 
for responding to the problems of interdependence, among which – and mainly 
– climate change.
In order to achieve these aims, this chapter is divided into three parts. In the 
first section, the international system under a conservative hegemony is described. 
In the second section, the structure of climate governance is analyzed. In the last 
one, the role of super and great climate powers as pivotal agents in this structure 
is also analyzed.
The international system under a conservative hegemony
Since the middle of the last decade, several movements in the international 
system converged to boost profound changes in its characteristics. Thus, new 
actors and new topics exert more influence on the outcomes of the field of IR. The 
migration of the climate crises to the core of international politics, the consolidated 
position of emerging nations, and the global economic crisis are probably the 
three most visible and transcendent movements, but it is clear that these are not 
the only ones.
First of all, the migration of the climate issue to the core of international 
politics is probably the most important systemic movement of the last five years, 
because it brings up the fact that it is not possible to maintain a sustainable 
civilizational path without a true reform of global governance structures. Some 
evidence of this movement includes: UN Security Council meeting to discuss 
climate change for the first time ever in 2007 and again in 2011; the creation of 
the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate to facilitate draft agreements 
to the negotiations at the heart of the UN; climate change as a recurring subject of 
G-20 and G-8 summits; massive presence of world leaders during the Copenhagen 
Conference (COP 15) in 2009 including the intense media coverage of the 
summit, and climate security becoming a key issue in the planning of the defense 
establishment of major powers. 
This migration to the center of the global agenda is related to the fact 
that climate change has already transcended the typical limits of international 
environmental problems, usually limited in reach, and is progressively bound to the 
problem of defining a safe operating space for humanity. To the extent that climate 
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change can have serious consequences in areas which are key to IR, this issue is no 
longer secondary and becomes part of the main concerns from the international 
community. The first area, the economy, has progressively been consolidated as 
a key element of climate studies (Stern 2006). The second one concerns Defense 
and Security, since climate issues have a growing importance among academics 
and policymakers (CNA 2007; Mabey 2008; EUA 2010).
A second major shift is the consolidation of power redistribution in the 
international structure, as identified by Joseph Nye (2011): from the West to the 
East, from state actors to non-state actors. In the first case, the process has been 
synthesized by Fareed Zakaria (2008), who coined the expression “the rise of the 
rest”: non-traditional state actors come into play vis-à-vis central states from the 
post-war period, resulting in an increase of power to the former. 
Another example of this new geography of power is the reproduction of groups 
of emerging countries with the goal of broadening their presence and influence in 
the system. The most relevant of such groups is the Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa group (BRICS). Inspired by a 2001 report from Goldman Sachs3, 
the group started working in 2006 as a discussion forum on great subjects related 
to global governance and became formal in 2010. However, it is a loose group 
because of major differences among the members. 
The consolidation of the G-20 as a broad presidential forum for global 
governance is another example of the growing importance of the emerging 
countries in the system. Created in 1999, the forum reunited the 20 most 
important economies in the planet – developed and emerging – and accounts 
for approximately 80% of world GDP, 80% of international trade, 80% of 
greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions and 70% of the world’s population. During 
the 2008 economic crisis, G-20 lead the international community’s efforts to avoid 
a meltdown of the global economy, due to the lack of legitimacy of the G-7 and 
the historical inefficiency of the UN General Assembly. Nonetheless, the challenges 
that have risen from interdependence have largely surpassed the group’s abilities 
to govern the international system. 
The third significant change in the international system is a shift in the 
conception of the world economy, due to the increase in relative presence of the 
states to the detriment of the relative presence of free markets. As a consequence, 
there is a growing consensus regarding the concept of a mixed economy, in which 
the role of the state is both to regulate and to promote incentives in order to expand 
some national productive sectors (especially energy) and boost the power of specific 
economic agents. The growing role of public expenditure in the aggregate demand 
is now a common part of the landscape of global economies. This phenomenon is 
mainly explained by the huge market failure that set off the 2008 crisis.
3  Report by the Goldman Sachs Investment Bank on the future poles in the multipolar economic system, which 
are Brazil, Russia, India and China – emerging countries, great in terms of territory, population, natural resources 
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Recent changes in the international system have another crucial driver: the 
drastic change in the terms of trade (TOT). The rise in the price of commodities 
vis-à-vis industrial goods has been constant during the last decade – it started in 
2003 and in opposition to what most analysts argued, it survived the outburst of 
the 2008 crisis. 
In spite of these important facts, many of the characteristics of the pre-2007 
international system still stand or, in some cases, have strengthened, such as 
interdependence, globalization and the expansion of democracy. 
There are several diverging visions of these transformations in the current 
literature of IR (Nye 2011; Ikemberry 2011; Slaughter 2009; Zakharia 2008); 
however, we give preference to our own image of the international order, which is 
synthetized in the concept of international system under a conservative hegemony 
(Viola, Franchini and Lemos Ribeiro 2012). The key idea is that the current 
structure of global governance is unable to tackle the most pressing civilizational 
challenges of our time – the climate crisis and the economic crisis –, which have 
been aggravated over the last five years. 
The criterion we use to qualify both the system and the agents in terms of 
conservative/reformists4 is the degree of commitment to global governance and 
especially what we call ‘climate commitment’5. Climate commitment is a key 
indicator for global governance because the climate crisis demands a stronger 
cooperation response when compared to other issues. Regarding international 
actors, especially the great state powers, the more they commit to the construction 
of collective mechanisms of climate and economic governance, the less the system 
becomes conservative. However, empirical data show the challenges related to the 
growing interdependence do not have compatible global governance mechanisms. 
The powerlessness that the UN had displayed during the post-war becomes 
clamant in our era, which is increasingly transnational, interdependent and 
characterized by a great acceleration of physical and social processes. Experiences 
with restricted structures of governance in terms of composition – but universal 
in terms of agenda – have been short on their results, like the G-20. To sum up, 
major powers that have a defining role in the international life are incapable and 
impotent in the conjuncture.
The notion of a conservative hegemony allows us to stress the key argument 
of this article; the climate crisis becomes a key civilizational driver and, as a 
consequence, it has a central role in defining the patterns of behavior among 
members of the international system. Within this framework, , the category 
climate commitment can be used to assess the characteristics and trends in the 
4  Reformist forces are those aware of the climate crisis and are willing to take post-soberanist measures to tackle 
it; conservative forces resist any major changes in the way business is conducted.
5  Climate commitment is defined as the level of awareness that a specific society has of climate change as a central 
civilizational driver. This commitment expresses itself not only in the state’s position in international negotiations, 
but in the emissions trajectory of GHG and in the depth of domestic climate policy. 
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international system; accordingly, it renders it impossible to hold a positive view 
due to the inability of current global governance structures to deal with this 
civilizational challenge. 
This pessimistic vision of the international system is not related to changes 
among the main agents of governance. The problem lies on the very characteristics 
of the system: the climate and the economic crises have pushed forward the need 
for efficient mechanisms of global governance.
The building up of an effective, efficient global governance has as a necessary 
condition: the shifting from sovereignty to post-sovereignty in most societies, 
and particularly in the most powerful ones. This transformation requires moving 
from narrow national interest to a broader national interest interconnected with 
universal interest (humanity and planet). It also implies shifting from short-term 
to long-term approaches and interests. Among the major powers, in real behavior, 
China, the US, India, Russia, and Brazil are based in narrow national interests; 
South Korea and Japan have internalized a small component of global interests 
in their mindset; while the EU has incorporated more than the previous – but 
still far away from being sufficient –, narrow European interest is still strong; also, 
sub-national (individual countries) interest is strong.
There are two forms of sovereignty: in the most radical, national state prevails 
over individual rights and over international institutions (China, Russia), and they 
are authoritarian regimes. In the other form, national state is limited by individual 
rights of citizens but it considers itself above international institutions (USA, India, 
Brazil, Japan and South Korea). In post-sovereignty, national state is restricted 
by individual rights and surrenders part of its power to international institutions. 
This is what the European Union promotes but has failed so far because it does 
not have other partners.
According to this conception of the international order, the role of the great 
state actors – major powers – is essential to define the characteristics of this system. 
The concept of major powers in times of the climate crisis demands, in order 
to assess properly their level of agency, the incorporation of two key variables: 
climate power and climate commitment. Following these criteria, a network of 
conservative and moderate conservative countries prevails in the system. Moderate 
countries act in support of the conservative coalition when it comes to designing 
mechanisms of global governance. 
In spite of this, there are reformist forces operating in the system, committed 
to a post-sovereignty type of global governance. These agents challenge the 
conservative hegemony and can be found at any level (from local to global) and 
sector (from public to private) of governance. These forces are increasing their 
level of agency but at an insufficient pace, thus not being consistent with systemic 
demands. 
In sum, the governance problem becomes closely linked to interdependence, 
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level of interdependence. Global governance structures cannot cope with the 
challenges that the growing influx of material and symbolic resources imposes at the 
system level. In the end, the rhythm at which social phenomena develops is largely 
faster than the ability of human communities to react, at least in this first stage.
Multilevel global governance
The global governance structure can be divided into areas so it can be better 
understood. These areas have their own logic, agents and interaction dynamics 
that are particular. Climate governance has different levels in its structure – actors 
spread in a two-dimension scheme – from local to global, public to private. This 
architecture features a specific agent that has the capacity to influence the climate 
social outcome in a decisive manner. This agent is called climate power. 
The concept of climate powers comprehends a combination of diverse 
dimensions of power. The first two dimensions have been widely contemplated 
in IR tradition: military capacity and economic power. The third dimension – 
climate power – is more innovative and closely related to the climate issue, and 
also less discussed. Climate power resides in: volume and trajectory of GHG in the 
atmosphere; human and technological capital to generate a considerable impact 
on the transition to a low-carbon economy; and the relation between resources 
and energy culture (Paterson 1996) – also called energy behavior. 
It is important to stress the strong level of inter-relation among the economic, 
military and climatic dimensions – each one affects the content and evolution of 
the other dimensions. The concept of climate power does not exclude non-material 
power factors, like influence and prestige. In specific terms, the level of climate 
commitment can be a great factor of ascendency over global climate dynamics. 
Based on these criteria, we identify three categories of climate powers: 
Superpowers: United States, China and the European Union. Altogether, 
they account for 55% of world GDP and 47% of global carbon emissions. 
Superpowers share three important characteristics: first of all, they all have a high 
proportion in global GHG emission (at least 10%) and gross global product (at 
least 15%); second of all, they have relevant human and technological capital for 
the decarbonization of the economy; and lastly, they have the power to veto any 
effective international global agreement. 
Great powers: Brazil, South Korea, India, Japan and Russia. They account 
for little less than 20% of world GDP and 20% of total emissions. 
Middle powers: South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Argentina, Colombia, 
Ukraine, Thailand, Venezuela, Malaysia, Philippines, Australia, Bangladesh, Egypt, 
United Arab Emirates, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia, 
Israel, Mexico, Norway, Switzerland, Taiwan and Turkey. 
The last two categories have limited importance in terms of global emissions 
share and participation in the world economy and, while acting on their own, they 
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lack the ability to veto a global international agreement. However, their behavior 
affects climate governance, since they can tamper with or boost the trajectory of 
global decarbonization. This last feature is especially decisive when considering 
great powers: an occasional great powers alliance could deeply change global 
climate politics. 
In terms of climate6 commitment we classify the leading state actors of global 
climate governance as follows: 
Conservative: India, Russia, Argentina, United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Nigeria, Pakistan, Thailand, Ukraine, Venezuela and 
Vietnam. 
Moderate conservative: USA, China, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, South 
Africa, Malaysia, Mexico, Turkey, Israel, Australia, Bangladesh and Philippines. 
Reformist: Norway, Taiwan, Switzerland, Singapore, the European Union, 
South Korea and Japan.
Major climate powers in the transition to a low-carbon economy
In this section we analyze the role of each super and great power in the 
global governance of climate change, both in terms of climate power and climate 
commitment. To do so, we consider key economic (GDP, population), climate 
(GHG emission, low-carbon capital, carbon intensity, vulnerabilities), social (social 
climate awareness, commitment to global governance), and political (climate 
politics and policies, international stance) features of each country. 
We use different sources of data. For GDP – always by purchasing power 
parity (PPP) – and population, International Monetary Fund (IMF)7 data; for 
GHG emissions and carbon intensity of GDP, authors’ own estimations based 
on World Resource Institute Climate Analysis Indicator Tool (WRI-CAIT)8; and 
for vulnerabilities assessment, the Maplecroft Climate Change Vulnerability Map 
(Maplecroft 2011).
Superpowers
The United States continues to be the most important country in the 
global climate governance arena, due to the fact that it is the second in global 
emissions and has the greatest potential of low-carbon technological innovation 
of worldwide impact (Giddens 2009). US has a population of over 313 million, a 
US$ 15,1 trillion GDP and a US$ 48,000 per capita GDP. The US emits, annually, 
6  This evaluation of policies considers the domestic positions as well as the international ones of each country 
on the climate problem, and analyzes the tendency of influx of policies regarding the conjuncture.
7  Available at <www.imf.org/external/data.htm>.
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7.8 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) – 15% of world emissions, 25 tons 
per capita figures and 0.5 ton for US$ 1,000 in GDP. The US is a moderate 
conservative in terms of the low-carbon economy transition and its vulnerability 
to climate change is medium.
The American economy operates under a relative high energy efficiency 
and low carbon intensity when compared to global standards, but it features one 
of the highest carbon intensity among developed countries due to its oil- and 
coal-based mixed energy matrix and large use of airplanes and individual cars as 
transportation. US emission rose 0.8% from 2001 to 2008, and after 2008 they 
have been stagnated as a result of the economic crisis and will probably remain as 
they are, a positive outcome of the increase in oil prices. 
The American government became extremely reckless during the Bush 
Administration (2001–2008), after leading the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol 
alongside the European Union during the Clinton Administration (1993–2000). 
The first four months of the Obama Administration signaled that the new 
government would tackle both the economic and climate crisis at once, boosting 
the decarbonization of the economy, as it considered that the two crises were 
associated. At the beginning of his term, a proposal of caps and trade was submitted 
to Congress, deepening and providing national reach to legislation already in force 
in California and New England (Speth 2010). 
However, this process lost momentum. The Waxman climate and energy 
bill, which imposes caps and quotas for carbon emission, was passed by the House 
in June 2009 and remained stuck in Senate during the second semester due to the 
Obama Administration healthcare reform priority over other proposals. 
Several factors account for this failure: extreme bipartisan polarization 
in Congress resulted in legislative paralysis and crisis of governability; high 
unemployment rates eroded Obama’s approval ratings; the extreme cold winter of 
2010 in the East Coast, demagogically used by the Republican Party as an example 
of the excesses in the assessments of global warming threat; strong lobbying by oil, 
coal, steel, cement and electricity industries against the climate bill arguing that it 
would make the American industry less competitive.
Strong opposition to emissions reduction commitments is observed in 
Congress; they mostly arise from the lack of formal commitment from great 
emerging countries, particularly China. In addition, since 2009 the issue of climate 
change has progressively become an issue of partisan cleavage between democrats 
and republicans, similar to abortion and guns control. (Rothental 2011). This 
fact makes it harder to debate based on scientific facts (or even common sense) 
and, thus, the possibility of a bipartisan agreement is drastically low. Should this 
cleavage consolidate itself as an element of American internal politics, the prospects 
of decarbonization of the US economy – as well as of the global economy – will 
be compromised.
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The problems of governability of the American democracy express, to 
some extent, the strong division in this society: one part is open and sensitive 
to globalization and the other is more closed and fundamentalist, and resorts 
to a semi-isolationist ideology. It is also observed as a deeper movement, the 
progressive erosion of the basic American values, steaming from the weak and 
uncertain economic recovery, the constant (un)employment crisis, the increase 
of social inequality and the growing stagnation of social mobility – possibly the 
most powerful driving force of American culture. 
The dynamics of traditional (conservative) forces versus decarbonizing 
(reformist) forces in the United States can be described as: in the private sector, 
middle-size oil companies, thermoelectric utilities, and the car industry (with the 
exception of Ford, even if the company’s efficiency level is not the same as the 
level of Japanese car makers) are conservative. Reformist forces are the solar, wind 
and nuclear energy sectors; information and technology industries like Google, 
Microsoft, Apple, Oracle and CNN; biotechnology, engine and capital goods, like 
General Electric; and the big retail chains, like Wal-Mart and green construction 
suppliers, among others. The bioenergy sector holds an intermediate position, 
to the extent that it represents an option in renewable energy, but it is produced 
from corn – inefficient when compared to other crops.
In politics and society, New England, New York, Maryland, California, 
Oregon, Washington and Illinois are considered reformist forces; especially New 
England and California, which already have climate legislation. The conservative 
forces predominate among most of the other states. The largest civil society 
organizations committed to climate governance are based in the United States, as 
well as the largest scientist community of climate research anywhere in the world; 
the most climate skeptical think tanks are also based in the US, with a high level 
of impact on national politics. As to the media, most national broadcast companies 
accept the scientific consensus regarding the climate issue (New York Times, CNN, 
Washington Post), but the Fox network and the local media are very conservative. 
The United States have a good potential of emissions reduction through 
technological change from thermoelectric utilities to “clean coal” (cleaner 
technologies) and carbon capture and storage (CCS); expansion of wind, solar, 
and nuclear energy and biofuel; reduction in size and increase in car efficiency; 
upgrading of electrical power grid; and the establishment of new green standards 
of construction – buildings and houses designed or remodeled to reduce emissions 
(Sachs 2009).
In the beginning of Obama’s term, there was an expectation in Europe that 
the US would advocate a role of co-leadership alongside the EU in global climate 
politics. This expectation was closer to become a reality in May 2009, but, when 
the Waxman Climate and Energy Bill was eventually passed by the House in June 
2009, the prospects were less favorable, due to the fact that the commitment of 
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proposed by the European Union and insignificant when compared to the 30–40% 
demanded by the IPCC. Finally, as argued before, the project was abandoned 
in 2010. 
Despite the attempts from the Democrat Administration to increase its 
climate commitment9, the US position on climate change has been conservative 
in the last decade. The official discourse of the American diplomacy is skeptical of 
the urgency in signing a legally-binding document in the realm of the UNFCCC 
and insists on the need of all great climate actors being included in the efforts of 
mitigation.
The European Union is formed by 27 countries and has a population of 
around 500 million people, a GDP of US$ 15.8 trillion and a per capita GDP 
of US$ 31,500, and emits 5.7 billion tons of CO2e – 11% of global emissions – 
and a 11 ton per capita figures and 0,36 ton of carbon for US$ 1,000 of GDP. 
Generally speaking, its vulnerability to the effects of climate change is medium 
and has a strong potential in terms of low-carbon technology.
The EU is heterogeneous, both in terms of per capita emission and carbon 
intensity: low in Nordic countries, Germany, the UK and France; medium in 
Spain, Belgium and Italy; and high in Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, 
Bulgaria, and in Baltic countries. EU’s emission increase at a 0.5% annual rate, 
as a result of stable emissions figures from Germany, the UK and Sweden, and 
the fast increase of emissions from Spain, Portugal, Greece and Eastern Europe 
countries – the latter countries are still below their 1990 baseline. However, just 
like in the United States, the economic crisis affected deeply the trajectory of 
emissions between 2008 and 2011, and in this particular case, lowering emission 
levels below 2007 figures.
The main political leaderships of the EU in the last few years have been in 
favor of an incisive action to mitigate global warming, despite the different degrees 
of climate commitment among its members, which also expresses the heterogeneity 
of the bloc. The governments and public opinion of the UK, Germany, Austria, 
Sweden, Netherlands and Denmark altogether with France, Belgium, Finland and 
Ireland – albeit the latter ones having a lower profile – are the most reformists. 
Of all EU’s big members, Germany and the United Kingdom are leaders; the 
former has a historical commitment to sustainability, which can be noticed in the 
political relevance of the environmental movement and the Green Party, and the 
early Industrial Recycling Bill of 1991. 
Regarding the UK, in the last few years, the British government has had the 
most advanced position among EU countries, as it passed in Parliament a law 
9  The Obama Administration is still committed to the low-carbon transition, forced to do so in areas in 
which there is less resistance, as shown, in February 2012, by its leadership in the international initiative of 
emissions reduction of three greenhouse gases of high radioactive effect – black carbon or soot, methane, and 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). The American initiative was released alongside the governments of Sweden, Canada, 
Mexico and Bangladesh, and comprehends the creation of an initial fund of US$ 15 million (US$ 12 million 
from the USA and US$ 3 million from Canada); more countries are expected to join as the program advances.
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that established a carbon budget, in November 2008, and the releasing of The 
UK Low Carbon Transition Plan, in July 2009. With this program, the UK has 
committed itself to reducing emissions in 34% by 2020, considering 1990 as the 
base-year (British Government 2009). The liberal presence in the new coalition 
government, which started in June 2010, has granted the continuity of this policy, 
even if at a slow pace due to the severity of the economic crisis. 
In terms of international positions, the UK government – under the Blair 
and Brown Administrations – was more proactive than their German counterparts, 
even if Germans are more advanced in the transition to a low-carbon economy. 
Yet, the decarbonization of the German economy is happening keeping a large 
industrial sector, whereas the British decarbonization takes places under severe 
decline of manufacturing. Among other big EU countries, France is a responsible 
actor regarding the climate, with low per capita emissions and an energy matrix 
based on nuclear power. The country, however, is less responsible than its British 
and German partners and will probably not meet the goals of the Kyoto Protocol; 
Italy, on the other hand, lacks a serious climate policy. 
Regarding other important countries of the bloc, Denmark has been on its way 
to becoming independent from oil for some time, led by conservative governments 
little committed internationally to the climate crisis until 2007. From this year 
on, the foreign climate profile of the Danish government has increased after the 
victory of a coalition headed by the Social Democrats. 
Poland’s economy features high per capita emissions figures, originated from 
a heavily coal-based energy matrix and low responsiveness from the public opinion 
regarding climate change. These elements put the Polish government along with 
the Italian one in the conservative coalition in the realm of the EU. Until 2007, 
Spain had also had a negligent position, but in that year, it admitted that their 
growing emissions during the last decades were an issue.
The 2008 economic crisis and the consequent instability in the Eurozone 
eroded the European ability to lead a transition towards a low-carbon economy, 
yet Europe is still the only reformist superpower. Considering that, the degree 
of agency of the bloc in the architecture of climate governance progressively 
withers. The EU only led the climate governance process between 1996 and 1998, 
alongside the American administration. After this period, the bloc was unable to 
guide the process, albeit some attempts. However, an occasional failure of the 
European project would be a huge setback in the prospects of humanity creating 
more efficient global governance mechanisms, since it is the first and only post-
sovereignty large-scale experiment ever tried.
In current international negotiations, the EU radicalizes its position on the 
American conservative behavior and tries to isolate them from the West. However, 
its attitude towards China is less stiff, because the EU does not demand so hard 
from the Chinese, as they do from the Americans, their commitment to a legally-
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importance to a key issue in shaping global climate governance: the growing role 
of the great emerging countries. 
China has a population of 1.35 billion people, a US$ 11.3 trillion GDP and 
a US$ 8,400 per capita GDP, emits 10.9 billion tons of CO2e a year – 21% of 
global emissions, 8 tons per capita and 0.96 tons of carbon for every US$ 1,000 
of GDP. Among the superpowers, China is the only one that has a high level of 
vulnerability to the effects of climate change, while some of its areas face extreme 
risks. It is a very carbon-intensive economy, due to its heavily coal- and oil-based 
energy matrix and, notably, its low energy efficiency. Contradicting the common 
sense approach, China’s per capita emissions are medium, not low. 
The costs of reducing emissions in China will be high, should the current 
model of industrialization be maintained, but a shift towards a model in which 
the internal market and an increase in productivity replace the export-led growth 
model is viable. The regime, however, is afraid of making this transition and 
remains in a conservative position, not being able to anticipate the problems and 
being reactive instead. In such terms, the Chinese political system shares the same 
dysfunctions of the great democracies.
The position of the Chinese government – in both energy and climate policies, 
as well as in international negotiations – had been negligent until 2006, when 
it started to change based on the country’s vulnerabilities assessment of climate 
change; that is why the country operates as a moderate conservative agent in the 
climate global governance structure. The government has pushed the development 
of wind and solar power and announced the goal of reducing their emissions growth 
rate. This goal was put forth in China’s National Climate Change Programme and 
in the anti-crisis stimulus package passed in November 2008, which had a 35% 
share of public expenditure on the transition to a low-carbon economy.
The government’s effort to improve the energy profile of the economy 
includes the extension of the nuclear power plants network – the number of planned 
nuclear power plants surpasses the number of facilities combined worldwide – and 
the building of hydroelectric power plants, China being one of the economies that 
uses this source of energy the most. According to McKinsey & Company (apud 
The Economist 2012), a consulting firm, this official attempt to progressively 
abandon the dependency on coal is not that simple: the fractured structure of the 
local mining business, the abundance of this mineral in both China and countries 
capable and willing to export it to the Chinese market – Australia, Indonesia and 
Mongolia – conspire against the official plans of demand reduction. 
Regarding the Chinese position in international negotiations, it was lagging 
behind when compared to their new energy policy. Addressing the UN General 
Assembly, in September 2009, President Hu Jintao announced that the country 
was willing to take responsibility in the fight against global warming and signaled 
the goal of reducing China’s carbon intensity in its GDP at a yearly rate of 4–5%, 
between the years of 2005–2020. Nonetheless, China is still reluctant to commit 
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to a peak of emissions and to a stabilization year prior to 2020 – as claimed by 
the international scientific community, the EU, the United States and Japan. This 
fact increases the ammunition of conservative groups in the American Congress.
As to technology, there has been great advance in both efficiency and 
productivity from Taiwanese photovoltaic solar energy companies, since 2009, 
and the formation of joint ventures for massive investment in China in a large 
program called “low-carbon cities.” After 2009, it is safe to say that there are 
two Chinas carbon-wise: on the one hand, a predominant traditional China, a 
powerhouse and exporter of carbon emissions; on the other hand, a new low-carbon 
China, still small, but which grows at a fast rate due to a very high savings and 
investment capacity of the country that will create a generation of new low-carbon 
entrepreneurs whose interests are contrary to the ones from traditional China. 
Thus, China is a conservative power for its history until 2008, but shows strong 
signs of low-carbon trends due to green investments from that time on. 
The reformist Chinese elite is located in high development poles, especially 
Shanghai, and in sectors of solar, wind and nuclear energy. In parallel, the 
conscience over the climate threat is bigger in the coast than it is in mainland. There 
are several elements that combined can explain the growth of reformist forces in 
Authoritarian China. First of all, three important drivers of decarbonization: a) a 
strong perception of the vulnerabilities to climate change in society; b) the need to 
maximize the competitiveness of the new economy; and c) the attempt to add soft 
power to the country. Second of all, the dynamics of the Communist Party, which 
in the last two decades has prioritized the technical skills and scientific background 
of its members over political ideology. Restoration of Confucian cultural heritage 
plays an important role in favor of climate sensitiveness. 
In 2012, globalist forces continued to gain ground in their movement to 
command the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and determine Chinese politics as 
a consequence, against nationalist forces. The biggest evidence of this process is the 
fall of the powerful governor of the Chongqing province (33 million inhabitants), 
Bo Xilai, who for many years had been a prominent figure in the CCP. After 
charges of corruption and a quick move from CCP leaders, Bo Xilai was removed 
from party posts, losing any chance of influence in the ongoing political transition. 
Bo’s removal is a positive sign of certain political and economic structural reforms: 
changes in the development model, shifting from exports to domestic expending 
and consumption and less exchange rate manipulation over the Yuan; some degree 
of political liberalization; awareness of environmental issues as a result of growing 
popular complaints and dissatisfaction with the degradation of the environment10. 
Considering that these movements are convergent with the position and interests 
from the core of democracies, should they become successful, these movements 
10  In an event of historic proportions, authorities of the Chinese Communist Party were obliged to abandon the 
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may help building systemic governance, in terms of global governance and climate 
governance.
Great powers
India has a population of 1.2 billion people, a US$ 4.5 trillion GDP and 
a per capita GDP of US$ 3,700. It emits, annually, 3.6 billion tons of CO2e – 
corresponding to 7% of world emissions, 3 tons of carbon per capita and 0.8 tons 
for every US$ 1,000 of GDP. It features a low per capita emissions rate and high 
carbon intensity due to low energy efficiency and elevated presence of coal and 
oil in the energy matrix. Approximately 70% of the country’s electricity has coal 
as its source, and considering that over 300 million Indians have no access to 
electricity, it is reasonable to expect that there will be a strong expansion of the 
demand over the next few years (The Economist 2012). In this context, coal is 
a natural option, to the extent that India is the world’s third largest supplier and 
the fifth in reserves. At the same time, the anticipated demand of energy can make 
India the leading importer of coal in the following years.
This increase in demand is also backing the development of clean alternative 
options, such as solar photovoltaic and wind energy, faster than Brazil, but slower 
than China. India has been partly developing ethanol, since it is the world’s largest 
sugar supplier, even though most of its production is for human consumption. The 
country features medium potential in terms of capital for the low-carbon transition 
and, in terms of vulnerability, is extremely exposed to the effects of climate change, 
a unique case among great powers. India is a conservative great power. 
India’s emissions grow at a 6% yearly rate. According to a report from 
Mckinsey (apud The Economist 2012), they will be 2.5 times higher in the year 
2030, resulting in the approximate figure of India accounting for 10% of the 
increment in global emissions. The position of the Indian government has been 
historically negligent, just like the Chinese counterparts, and has not changed 
yet. Some academic and government sectors in India have elaborated a conspiracy 
theory based on historical grudge against the West, particularly against the 
British, entitled Carbon Colonialism, according to which the proposals of carbon 
mitigation in developing countries are a way of maintaining the status quo of 
underdevelopment. 
The voluntary commitment of the country presented at international forums 
is to reduce its carbon intensity of GDP in 20–25% by 2020 when compared to the 
levels of 2005, but excluding the agricultural sector. Indian authorities justify their 
conservative position arguing that India features a low level of per capita emissions 
and that there is a development imperative, which demands that 470 million 
people be taken out of poverty (IISD 2011). The negative side to the low per capita 
emissions figures is the high fertility rate (2.8 children per woman). In terms of 
birth rate, India is the most non-responsible among the BASIC countries, along 
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with South Africa (2.7 children), in contrast with China (1.3 children) and Brazil 
(1.9 children), both below replacement rates (The Economist 2011).
India is a democratic regime – albeit being a low-quality democracy due to 
the heritage of the caste system – and has an important environmental movement, 
which contests, with a certain degree of ambivalence, the official position. The 
Indian government is very fragmented and inefficient, which makes it even harder 
for a transition towards a less-carbon economy to take place. Approximately 
18 Ministries work on climate change subjects and there is no clear leadership from 
none. The combination of an inefficient political regime, with extreme regional 
inequality and a very particular perception of natural catastrophes conspire against 
a better form of governance of the climate issue in India. 
Russia has a population of 142 million people, a US$ 2.4 trillion GDP and 
a US$ 16,700 per capita GDP. It emits 2.8 billion tons of CO2e per year, which 
corresponds to 5.5% of global emissions, 20 tons per inhabitant and 1.2 tons of 
carbon for every US$ 1,000 of GDP. It features a medium vulnerability to the 
effects of climate change and has small capital for the low-carbon transition, a 
single case among great and superpowers. It is a society that has enriched greatly 
in the last decade, but has low energy efficiency and an energy matrix heavily 
based on fossil fuel, being a large exporter of oil and gas. The country operates as 
a conservative power in the global governance of the climate. 
Russia has an extremely particular position in world climate affairs for the 
following reasons: i) Russia sees itself as a potential loser in the scenario of a low-
carbon economy, since its greatest economic feature is a plethora of fossil fuel; 
ii) among the great emitters, the country is the only one whose elites and opinion 
makers perceive – at least until the extremely hot 2010 summer – that global 
warming could favor their interests, since it would greatly expand their arable lands. 
Japan has a population of 128 million people, a US$ 4.4 trillion GDP and 
a per capita GDP of US$ 34,000. It emits 1.4 billion tons of CO2e a year, which 
corresponds to 2.7% of total emissions, 11 tons per inhabitant and 0.32 tons of 
carbon for every US$ 1,000 of GDP. Japan is the economy with the lower carbon 
intensity worldwide, due to its enormous energy efficiency and the preponderant 
role of nuclear energy in their power supply. The country is highly vulnerable to 
the negative effects of climate and a very high potential in terms of low-carbon 
capital; however, this potential is restrained by the unwillingness of society and 
the government to lead this transition at the world level. Despite this, Japan is a 
reformist country in the climate arena.
Part of Japan’s public opinion and an important part of Japanese companies 
and entrepreneurs (Honda and Toyota are emblematic) are in favor of an expedited 
transition to a low-carbon economy. Japanese society seems to have internalized the 
last two decades of economic recession in a unique way, progressively becoming a 
post-growth society, in which the reality of stagnation does not bring significant 
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hierarchical and aging, which makes it less sensitive to the influxes of globalization 
and places considerable limitations for it to become a paradigm in terms of global 
dynamism, as it had been in the 1970s, when the reforms carried out after the 
first oil crisis (1973) placed the country on the cutting edge of energy efficiency 
and technology.
Japan’s leadership role in international affairs lags behind its potential due 
to Japan’s low-profile foreign policy and, more recently, to negative effects on the 
aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Despite the fact that the definite 
effects of the plant’s explosion are still unclear, it is possible to say that there were 
carbonizing consequences – as well as effects on the balance of payments – for the 
Japanese economy, as a result of the temporary shutdown of most of the reactors. 
In the long run, the commitment of Japan with the development and use of non-
fossil technologies is complex. On the one hand, Fukushima was absorbed by elites 
as an external event; thus, the accident had little impact on the legitimacy of the 
nuclear option. On the other hand, the impact on society in terms of insecurity 
was larger, which strengthened the anti-nuclear alliance, with an uncertain impact 
on politics. 
South Korea is a reformist great power that has a population of 49 million 
people, a US$ 1.5 trillion GDP and a per capita GDP of approximately 
US$ 31,000, emits annually 676 million tons of CO2e – representing 1.3% of 
global emissions, and 14 tons per capita and 0.43 tons of carbon per US$ 1,000. 
South Korean society has a high level of exposure to effects of climate change and is 
important because the country has a very large capital of human and technological 
resources to lead the low-carbon economy transition. 
In the last few years, South Korea has kept a profile that places the country 
on the forefront of the low-carbon economy transition, which includes a goal of 
emissions reduction of 30% by 2020 from the business as usual (BAU) emissions 
scenario (IISD 2011). Due to this fact and because it operates close to the 
technological frontier, the country deserves this place among the great climate 
powers, even if their share of global emission is not that significant. The Korean 
program is an ambitious bet that combines capacity for innovation, technological 
capital and human capital. The Korean elites were the most skillful and were able 
to manage the financial and climate crisis, earmarking 80% of their fiscal rescue 
package for clean policies. 
Finally, it is important to recall that the Korean economy is highly competitive 
– based on the coexistence of big enterprises and the State – and in which the 
decision making process offers a dialogue channel between corporate boards and 
political offices, making the mechanism of policy implementation more efficient. 
By doing so, the transition to a low-carbon economy takes places under heavy 
state interventionism – in the sense that corporations and the government work 
together –, when compared to what happens in Frances, Germany or the United 
Kingdom.
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 Brazil has a population of 195 million people, a 2.3 trillion GDP and a 
per capita GDP of US$ 11,800. Its annual emissions are around 2 billion tons of 
CO2e – 4.5% of world emissions – and 11 tons per capita and 0.9 ton for every 
US$ 1,000 of GDP. In the last five years, Brazil transitioned from the conservative 
side to the moderate conservative field in global climate governance. This transition 
had three main pillars: a) drastic reduction in deforestation rates between 2005 and 
2011 (Viola and Franchini 2012); b) a voluntary commitment to reduce emission 
trajectory in November 2009; and c) the sanctioning of a Climate Bill (Brazilian 
Law no. 12,187) at the beginning of 2010.
However, after this positive impulse between 2009 and 2010, the climate and 
environmental agenda has suffered considerable setbacks, like the expansion of the 
oil sector, the reform of Brazilian Forest Code, increase in gasoline consumption, the 
stagnation of ethanol, and the persistent expansion of individual/private transport. 
Policies at the federal level have abandoned the focus on issues of low carbon, in 
particular, and environmental, in general: not only has the implementation of the 
Climate Law barely advanced, but, in early 2012, the government also responded 
to the international crisis with a traditional carbon-intensive industrial stimulus 
package, focused on the car manufacturing sector and decided to eliminate taxation 
on oil consumption on the same day as Rio+20 ended, in June 2012.
Conclusion
Two main drivers shape global climate governance: climate power and climate 
commitment. Climate power refers to the level of influence of certain agents over 
the climate social outcome at systemic level. Climate commitment analyses how 
the logic of governance in this field is defined by the interaction among forces that 
understand the climate problem as a civilizational crisis – reformist – and forces 
that resist the profound transformations necessary to stabilize the climate system 
– conservative. In this dynamics, the conservative forces are predominant and this 
accounts for the reason why the international system is defined in this article as 
one under a conservative hegemony: the system’s evident incapacity to develop an 
adequate response to the major challenges of our time, such as global financial crises, 
climate change, and planet boundaries, which are deeply-demanding problems, 
requiring considerable governance capacity. 
The structure of climate governance is extremely complex and comprehends 
diverse dimensions – economic, environmental and security – and several actors 
– public and private, local and global. Yet, there is a type of agent – a state 
actor – whose concentrated capacities can exert high influence on climate social 
outcome: climate powers. At times when focusing on the formal climate regime 
– UNFCCC – results in fruitless attempts to evaluate the future of global politics 
in this field, it is convenient to adopt an approach based on the behavior of these 
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As discussed before, the majority of super and great powers are not reformist 
– the US, China, India, Brazil and Russia –, and those who are – the EU, South 
Korea and Japan – lack the agency necessary to stimulate global behavior more 
favorable to the stability of the climate system. The fact that the US and China are 
moderate conservative is central to our analysis: American society is divided, and 
it hinders any pro-global governance policy; China is at a slow pace and taking 
an uncertain road to low carbon. The only superpower committed to climate 
governance – the EU – is going through a process of economic and political crisis 
that compromises its ability to lead global decarbonization. This is the main reason 
for which the international system is blocked when it comes to this issue, and this 
is why it is described as conservative. 
The year of 2009 changed profoundly the international political economy 
of climate change. The combination of the political failure of Copenhagen and 
the suspicions regarding climate science after the so-called climategate (Prins et al. 
2010) spread feelings of cynicism, on one side, and skepticism, on the other. 
The heritage of the Kyoto Protocol, which left the United States and the great 
emerging countries out of carbon constraints, has been dismantled (Ladislaw 
2010). Evidence suggests that the Kyoto Protocol is ceasing to exist as an emissions 
reduction mechanism in 2012, placing more uncertainty over capacity of the UN 
system to respond properly to the climate problem. 
A new treaty – comprehensive and legally binding – is virtually impossible 
unless the United States passes a climate bill that imposes quantified emissions 
reduction. Due to the current political dynamics, this is unlikely to happen. 
The most optimistic scenario (2013–2014) includes the reelection of President 
Obama in November 2012, victory of Democrats in the House of Representatives 
and in the Senate and the decision of reelected President Obama to prioritize the 
climate bill at the beginning of his second term. The shale gas revolution from 2011 
to 2012 – which promises to deepen in the near future – will likely have mixed and 
uncertain impact in the readability of the American society to decarbonization. 
The economic and security dimensions of the international system have a 
key impact on the climate dimension and it is necessary to promptly take them 
into account in any credible analysis of the future of climate governance. The 
global economic crisis that started in 2008 has given the climate problem a lower 
priority – one consequence of the crisis – when compared to demands of economic 
recovery, as observed in the American midterm elections of 2010. Most mainstream 
economists and opinion formers continue separating the climate crisis from the 
economic crisis. 
If this trend of cooperation and continuing depolarization persists in the 
international system in the following years, and Obama is reelected in 2012, the 
United States will be more susceptible to a change in its position – from a moderate 
conservative superpower to a reformist one. It is not likely but it is possible to 
think a future scenario in which an alliance among the EU, Japan, South Korea, 
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Brazil and the United States could persuade/constrain China, Russia and India 
to set their emissions peaks and different stabilization years inside the range set 
by scientific predictions.
Bibliographic references
CNA. National Security and the Threat of Climate Change. 2007. Disponível em: <http://www.
cna.org/>. Acesso em 29 jan. 2011.
IKEMBERRY, John. The future of the liberal world order: internationalism after America. Foreign 
Affairs, Mai/Jun 2011.
IPCC. Cambio Climático 2007. Informe de Síntesis. 2007. Disponível em: http://www.ipcc.
ch/. Acesso em 28 jun. 2010.
IISD (International Institute for Sustainable Development). Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol. 12 
no. 513, jun. 2011. Disponível em: <http://www.iisd.ca/>. Acesso em 17 jul. 2011.
MABEY, Nick. Delivering Climate Change Security. Royal United Services Institute for Defence 
and Security Studies (RUSI), 2008. Disponível em: <http://www.rusi.org/>. Acesso em 7 jul. 2010.
MAPLECROFT. Climate Change Vulnerability Map 2011. Disponível em: <http://www.
maplecroft.com>. Acesso em 22 jan. 2012.
NYE, Joseph. The future of power. Washington, DC: Public Affairs, 2011.
SLAUGHTER, Anne Marie. America’s edge: power in the networked century. Foreign Affairs, 
January/February, 2009. 
STERN, Nicholas. Stern Review: La economia del Cambio Climático. 2006. Disponível em: 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/>. Acesso em 9 set. 2009.
THE ECONOMIST. Pocket World in Figures. Profile Books Ltd., London, 2011.
VIOLA, Eduardo & FRANCHINI, Matías. Climate Policy in Brazil. Public awareness, social 
transformations and emission reductions. Ian Bailey and Hugh Compston (Eds.). The Politics of 
Climate Policy in Rapidly Industrialising Countries. Hampshire: Palgrave, 2012.
VIOLA, Eduardo, FRANCHINI, Matías & LEMOS RIBEIRO, Thaís. Sistema Internacional de 
Hegemonia Conservadora: governança global e democracia na era da crise climática. forthcoming.
WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION (WMO). Weather extremes in a changing 
climate: hindsight on foresight. N° 1075. Disponível em: http://www.wmo.int/. Acesso em 25 
fev. 2012.
ZAKARIA, Fareed. O mundo pós-americano. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2008.
Received July 30, 2012
Accepted September 15, 2012
Abstract
In the last five years, climate change has been established as a central civilizational driver of our 
time. As a result of this development, the most diversified social processes – as well as the fields 
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double challenge could be explained as follows: 1) in empirical terms, climate change imposes 
a deepening of cooperation levels on the international community, considering the global 
common character of the atmosphere; and 2) to International Relations as a discipline, climate 
change demands from the scientific community a conceptual review of the categories designed 
to approach the development of global climate governance. The goal of this article is to discuss 
in both conceptual and empirical terms the structure of global climate change governance, 
through an exploratory research, aiming at identifying the key elements that allow understanding 
its dynamics. To do so, we rely on the concept of climate powers. This discussion is grounded in 
the following framework: we now live in an international system under conservative hegemony 
that is unable to properly respond to the problems of interdependence, among which – and 
mainly –, the climate issue.
Keywords: climate change; climate powers; global governance; the international system.
Resumo
Nos últimos cinco anos, a mudança climática tem se estabelecido como um condutor central 
de nosso tempo. Como resultado desse desenvolvimento, os mais diversificados processos 
sociais – bem como os campos científicos que os estudam – têm tido suas dinâmicas alteradas. 
Em Relações Internacionais, esse duplo desafio pode ser explicado da seguinte maneira: 1) em 
termos empíricos, a mudança climática impõe um aprofundamento nos níveis de cooperação 
na comunidade internacional, considerando o caráter comum global da atmosfera; e 2) para 
as Relações Internacionais enquanto disciplina, a mudança climática demanda da comunidade 
cientifica uma revisão conceitual das categorias concebidas para abordar o desenvolvimento 
da governança climática global. O objetivo deste artigo é discutir em ambos termos empírico e 
conceitual a estrutura da governança em mudança climática global, por meio de uma pesquisa 
exploratória, com o objetivo de identificar os elementos-chave que permitam entender sua 
dinâmica. Para isso, levamos em conta o conceito de potências climáticas. Esta discussão está 
fundamentada sob o seguinte quadro: nós agora vivemos em um sistema internacional sob 
uma hegemonia conservadora que é incapaz de responder adequadamente aos problemas da 
interdependência, dentre os quais – e principalmente –, a questão climática. 
Palavras-chave: mudança climática; potências climáticas; governança global; o sistema 
internacional.
